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ARTICLES
CRIME WITHOUT CONVICTION:
SUPERVISION WITHOUT SENTENCE
THE HONORABLE ALFRED

B.

TETON*

Changes in the field of sentencing have made alternatives to incarceration the standard sentence in criminal cases for a number of
reasons, philosophical and practical. Chief among these are overcrowded conditions in prisons, reluctance to incarcerate first offenders, avoidance of associations that could prove a hardening and embittering experience, and "because it does not involve the complete
dislocation of the offender from the community in which he will ultimately have to live."' The best known of these alternatives is "probation," a generic term that has become a ready reference to all
non-confinement options without regard to differences in their history and impact. Another alternative to confinement is supervision,
a penalty which was not added to the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections ("the Code") 2 until 1976.
*

The author is currently a Judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

B.A. University of Chicago; J.D. University of Chicago; L.L.M. Yale.
1. Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, A.B.A. INST. ON JUD. AD. (2d ed.
1979).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1985). Under Illinois law, a
court may impose either alone, or in combination, the following dispositions for all
felonies and misdemeanors:
1. probation,
2. periodic imprisonment,
3. conditional discharge,
4. imprisonment,
5. that the offender clean up and repair the damages,
6. that the offender make restitution to the victim.
Id. § 1005-5-3(6). The legislature has, however, limited the court's discretion in imposing these alternatives to imprisonment in specified circumstances. Id. § 1005-53(c). For example, probation, periodic imprisonment or conditional discharge can not
be imposed for murder, attempted murder, residential burglary, and criminal sexual
assault, as well as specified other crimes. Id. § 1005-5-3(c)(2).
Apart from the Unified Code of Corrections, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-1 to
1008-6-1 (1985), conditional discharge or supervision is authorized under other Illinois statutes. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 /2,§ 1410 (1985) (supervision allowed for first
offenders of possessory offenses for cannibis or controlled substances); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, §§ 704-7, 705-2(d), 705-4, 705-6 (1985) (supervision allowed under the Juvenile
Court Act).
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Before 1978, the annual reports of the Administrative Office of
the Illinois Courts to the Supreme Court included all dispositions of
probation, conditional discharges, and supervision under one heading: probation.3 Since then, these annual reports have become more
particularized and demonstrate an overwhelming acceptance of supervision as the preferential mode of disposition in misdemeanor,
ordinance, and conservation charges (not cases) in the Municipal
Department of the Circuit Court in Cook County.' This is illustrated
in the following table which includes all such dispositions except
those involving only fines:
Table of Dispositions5
1983
1982
Conditional
Discharge
2522
2154
Imprisonment*
13862
16954
Probation
6165
6059
Supervision
28723
35394
*Includes periodic imprisonment.

1984
3441
15036
3780
33800

Totals
Number
%
8117 4.9
45852 27.3
16004 9.5
167890 100

Extrastatutory Period
Although serving as an instrumentality of punishing offenders
without confinement, the utility of probation is attenuated for those
defendants whose crimes do not warrant their being stigmatized
with a record of conviction. In response to the demands of bar and
bench, and the perceived interests of society, "supervision" evolved
into an amalgam of probation and postponement. It was initially
used only for minors, but once tried and found acceptable, "supervision" broke the age barrier. It became available to all defendants
who are guilty of misdemeanors that do not warrant incarceration or
the generation of a criminal record.6
In People v.Parr7 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District declared supervision "an effective and useful tool in the administration of justice." The court justified the practice of placing
minors on supervision in these terms:
3. Compare ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, 156 (1974) and
id. at 172 (1975) with ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, 210 (1978).
4. See, e.g. ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, 210 (1978).
5. The data in this table was drawn from THE ANNUAL REPORTS TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS, (1982 ed. at 240; 1983 ed. at 246; 1984 ed. presently not in print).
6. See Sullivan, SUPERVISION COMES TO ALL OF ILLINOIS, 65 ILL. B.J. 190, 190-91
(1976).
7. 130 Il.App. 2d 212, 264 N.E.2d 850 (1st Dist. 1970).
8. Parr,130 Ill.
App. 2d at 217, 264 N.E.2d at 853.
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When a trial court places a minor on supervision, it is with the hope
of rehabilitating him. If at the termination of the supervision period,
there is reason to believe that the defendant has been rehabilitated,
the finding of guilty is not entered and the defendant is discharged,
for the purpose of supervision is to save the minor a criminal record.
However, if the court is advised at any time during the period of supervision of activities which demonstrate a defendant's misbehavior or
lack of cooperation with an appointed supervisory agency, the court
may then enter its finding of guilty on the date for which supervision
was to terminate or at any time prior thereto.9
In another context, another appellate court characterized such action as "judge made law developed to meet social need."10
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the validity of supervisory
orders in People v. Breen," although the issue before the court was
only the appealability of the order. The court described the procedure in the following terms:
The practice of placing a defendant on supervision . . . apparently is
fairly common. In one form, social service supervision, a defendant is
ordered to report regularly to a social service agency during the period
of his supervision, generally six months to a year, during which time
his case is continued. When that period expires without further incident, the defendant is discharged from supervision and the criminal
charge dismissed. In another form, court supervision, the case is similarly continued during the period of supervision, but the defendant is
under no obligation other than to refrain from further criminal conduct. Apparently under both forms of supervision, the trial judge
hears the evidence, satisfies himself of guilt and then either refrains
from entering a finding of guilty or enters a finding, immediately vacates it and enters an order for supervision."
The general acceptance of the practice notwithstanding, the Illinois
Supreme Court unanimously found that the authority to determine
"the nature, character and extent of the penalties" for criminal offense was legislative, not judicial," and held that "absent appropri9. Id. (cited with approval in People v. Jonas, 4 Ill.
App. 3d 297, 299-300, 280
N.E.2d 731, 734 (lst Dist. 1972)).
10. Gronek v. Neuman, 52 Ill. App. 2d 250, 252, 201 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1st Dist.
1964).
11. 62 I1. 2d 323, 342 N.E.2d 31 (1976). In Breen, the defendant had been
found guilty of theft and was sentenced to the House of Correction for 90 days. Id. at
325, 342 N.E.2d at 32. Breen offered to repay the amount he had allegedly taken, so
the trial court vacated its initial finding and placed Breen under "social service supervision." Id. Breen was thereby to replace and repay the sum of $180.00. Id. Breen
appealed this disposition, but the trial court dismissed the appeal because there was
no final judgment from which to appeal. People v. Breen, 26 Ill. App. 3d 547, 325
N.E.2d 738 (1st Dist. 1975). Breen's appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was, however, 12.
accepted.
62 Ill. 2d at 325, 342 N.E.2d at 32.
Breen,Breen,
62 Ill. 2d at 326, 342 N.E.2d at 32. After the Code authorized supervision, the entry of an order of supervision, immediately vacated, was held impermissible. People v. Scognamiglio, 119 Ill. App. 3d 747, 752, 457 N.E.2d 99, 102 (2d Dist.
1983); People v. Oswald, 106 IlI. App. 3d 645, 650, 435 N.E.2d 1369, 1373 (2d Dist.
1982).
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ate legislation, a trial judge is without authority to place a defendant
on supervision.' Is Accordingly, the court commended "the subject to

the consideration of the General Assembly.""

The Supreme Court's rejection of extrastatutory supervision in
Breen inspired the legislature, which had been engaged in twenty
years of contemplative thought about supervision, 5 to amend the

Code' s and create a statutory haven for supervision. The statute so
swiftly enacted, within little more than six months after the Breen
decision, blended the "sociological" and "court" forms of supervision described in Breen. This was accomplished by authorizing the
trial court to impose conditions of supervision specifically itemized

in the Code, or other conditions which the court found in its discretion to be appropriate.

7

The Code defines the available non-confining dispositions as:
Probation: "a conditional revocable release under the supervision of a probation officer."'
Conditional discharge: "conditional and revocable release
without probationary supervision.' 9
Supervision: "conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision for a period of time, at the successful conclu13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
[I]n

Breen, 62 Ill.
2d at 327-28, 342 N.E.2d at 33-34.
Id. at 328, 342 N.E.2d at 34.
Sullivan, Supervision Comes to All of Illinois, 65 ILL B.J. 190 (1976).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-21 (1985) (effective Aug. 2, 1976).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1 (1985). In particular, a court may:

addition to other reasonable conditions . . . as determined .
proper discretion of the court ... require that the person:

.

. in the

(1) make a report to and appear in person before or participate with the court
or such courts, person, or social service agency as directed ...
(2) pay a fine and costs;
(3) work or pursue a course of study or vocational training;
(4) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric treatment; or treatment for
drug addiction or alcoholism;
(5) attend or reside in a facility ... for the instruction or residence of defendants on probation;
(6) support his dependants;
(7) refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon;
(8) and in addition, if a minor:
(i) reside with his parents or in a foster home;
(ii) attend school;
(iii) attend a non-residential program for youth;
(iv) contribute to his own support at home or in a foster home; and
(9) make restitution or reparation ... ;
(10) perform some reasonable public service work ...
(11) comply with the terms and conditions of an order of protection. ...
Id. § 1005-6-3.1(c). The period of supervision must be reasonable, and may not exceed two years. Id. § 1005-6-3.1(b).
18. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-18 (1985).
19. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-4 (1985).
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sion of which the charges are dismissed."2
The essential differences and similarities among these dispositions are clear: all involve prescribed but varying periods of supervision. Probation, however, must be served under a probation officer
and both probation and conditional discharge, whether or not the
prescribed periods are successfully completed, result in records of
conviction. Conditions of probation and conditional discharge may
include terms of periodic imprisonment. Supervision on the other
hand, is limited to defendants not charged with felonies.2 It does
not require reporting or surveillance and, if the conditions thereof
are complied with, no sentence is entered, the defendant is discharged, and the charges are dismissed. Two years after discharge of
a successfully completed supervision, the record of arrest may be expunged except that an expungement for driving while under the in2
fluence of alcohol ("DUI") must await the passage of five years.
Moreover, a defendant previously convicted or assigned to supervision for DUI is precluded from securing a new order of supervision
during a five-year moratorium. 2
CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
Paragraph 1005-6-1(c) of the code provides that upon accepting
a plea of guilty, or upon finding a defendant guilty, whether by jury,
court,2 4 or on stipulated facts, the trial court may enter an order of
supervision if it believes that the offender will not commit further
crimes and that the order would be in the best interests of justice,
the public, and the defendant.2 Once the court has determined that
supervision will satisfy these awesome considerations and their manifestly unpredictable consequences, an order with appropriate conditions may be entered, further proceedings deferred, and entry of
judgment postponed until either the conclusion of the supervisory
period 20 or the revocation of supervision in accordance with the
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-21 (1985).
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(c) (1985). "The court may . . .enter an
order for supervision of the defendant if the defendant is not charged with a felony .. " Id..
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(0 (1985). Probationers, however, cannot
have their sentence of probation expunged. People v. Bushnell, 101 Ill. 2d 261, 266,
461 N.E.2d 980 (1984). Regarding the DUI statute, see infra note 23.
23. A defendant who has been convicted or assigned supervision for violating
Section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-501 (1985)
(driving under the influence of alcohol), or a similar provision in a local ordinance,
within the past five years, cannot be given supervision. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 10056-1(d) (1985). The Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of
this moratorium. People v. Coleman, 111 I1.2d 87, 488 N.E.2d 1009 (1986).
24. See People v. Boykin, 94 Ill.
2d 138, 445 N.E.2d 1174 (1983).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(c) (1985).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(d) (1985). Supervision has often been
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statute. 17

In discussing the determination of "appropriate" conditions,
frequent reference to probation is unavoidable. For in the area of
probation, precedent is plentiful and its applicability to supervision
persuasive. In probation as well as supervision, both parties share a
common objective in obtaining a written order that specifies the
conditions. Colloquy among the parties and the trial judge is no substitute for a court order. In People v. Susberry, 8 the defendant was
convicted of criminal housing management and sentenced to probation. The common law record reflected that the order provided:
"Condition of probation is that building is to be reinspected six
months from today and reports forwarded to the defendant, State's
Attorney, and to the Court."2 9 During the proceedings, the trial
court said: "In six months if he violates probation by not having the
building in good repair, he will serve the remaining six months in
the House of Correction." 0 The appellate court stated that these
proceeding and provisions of the Probation Act, including the requirement that an offender sentenced to probation shall be given a
certificate setting forth the conditions, "makes the situation plain
that conditions of probation should not be orally stated but should
be spelled out in the probation order in clear and unmistakable
detail." 81
Although the Code does not provide that a certificate of conditions must be given concurrently with the order of supervision, repeated references to the entry of supervision orders, and the need to
memorialize the conditions imposed, makes a written order of supervision indispensable.8 2 The First Municipal District of the Circuit
Court of Cook County has recently issued a directive for this purpose.88 Moreover, a form of order with standard conditions is usually
submitted by the State's Attorney, and additional conditions that
are relevant to the offense may be added thereto.
analogized to a continuance because of the postponement of an entry of final judgment. E.g., People v. Roper, 116 Ill. App. 3d 821, 824, 452 N.E.2d 748, 750 (1st Dist.
1983). As a consequence, the appealability of an order of supervision was debatable,
People v. Tarkowski, 100 Ill. App. 3d 153, 160, 426 N.E.2d 631, 636 (2d Dist. 1981),

until the Illinois Supreme Court amended its Rule 604(b). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §
604(b) (1985). See infra note 110.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-6-4 to 1005-6-4.1 (1985). For a discussion of
revocation, see infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
28. 68 Ill. App. 3d 555, 386 N.E.2d 361 (1st Dist. 1979).
29. Susberry, 68 Ill.
App. 3d at 559, 386 N.E.2d at 364.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 561, 386 N.E.2d at 365.
32. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1 (1985) (written certificate of
conditions to supervision order not required) with Susberry, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 561,

386 N.E.2d at 365 (requiring written conditions of supervision).
33. Memorandum, Office of the Supervision Judge, Municipal Department of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Sept. 11, 1985).
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The Code itemizes" more than ten conditions of supervision
that the court may impose, and authorizes the addition of "other
reasonable conditions related to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant." 6 Significantly, however, one condition that may not be imposed is imprisonment. Despite some views
that it is unwise to so limit the fashioning of a sentence,"6 the reviewing courts regard imprisonment incompatible with the purpose
and philosophical inspiration of the legislation. 7 The attachment of
any term of incarceration would irreconcilably contradict the determination made before supervision was imposed; to wit, that confinement is not required. Thus, the imposition of 24 hours in jail was
8 The
overturned as unauthorized by statute and inappropriate.3
court that is moved to give a defendant placed on supervision a flavor of confinement appears to be inviting the favor of reversal.
Another condition the Code explicitly authorizes is restitution
in an amount not exceeding the actual property or pecuniary loss. 9
"Restitution" is distinctly not to be equated with damages. 0 Efforts
to expand a statute to permit the collection of damages in criminal
proceedings have failed
for the statute does not permit such enlarge41
ment of the remedy.
When shall the financial capacity of the defendant to make restitution be determined? The statute is silent and the decisions have
gravitated to the conclusion that the determination need not be
made when the condition is imposed. 4' At that time, the order for

restitution represents a goal for achievement, not a prediction of
collectability.
The reason for urging that the ability to make restitution be
determined when the order is entered, is that the hearing thereon
will create more realistic expectations of both benefits and obliga34. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also People v. Edwards, 135
Ill. App. 3d 671, 679, 482 N.E.2d 137, 142 (4th Dist. 1985) (the trial court has broad
discretion in imposing conditions to supervision).
36. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 192.
37. People v. Roper, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 821, 452 N.E.2d 748 (1st Dist. 1983).

38. Id.
39. ILL. REv.STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(c)(9) (1985). See also supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
40. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crimes: Assessing the Role
of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52, 113 n.344 (1982).
41. See People v. Chacon, 125 Ill. App. 3d 649, 657, 466 N.E.2d 374, 379 (2d
Dist. 1984) (order of restitution must be adequately supported under restitution statute); People v. Prell, 299 Ill.
App. 130, 133, 19 N.E.2d 637, 638 (1st Dist. 1939) (noth-

ing in the probation law grants the power to use criminal process to collect damages).
42. Chacon, 125 Il.
App. 3d at 657, 466 N.E.2d at 379; Edwards, 135 Ill.
App.
3d at 679, 482 N.E.2d at 142. See also People v. Maldonado, 109 Ill.2d 319, 487
N.E.2d 610 (1985) (requiring a consideration of ability to pay before a fine is imposed
on conviction).
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tions. Whatever time be elected for determining ability to pay, lump
sum payments should not be ordered unless payable concurrently
with the entry of the order; if not paid immediately, all financial
obligations should be payable on an installment basis in accordance
with a specific schedule. Monitorship of a default and payment program would not only improve the prospects for collection, but would
also present opportunities to adjust the amount of the installments
if changed conditions warrant.
If restitution is not made, supervision may not be revoked unless the failure to comply is due to a willful refusal to pay, with the
burden of proof on the State. 48 Proof of nonpayment and "willful
refusal" are not synonymous.'4 Imprisonment for involuntary nonpayment of fines has been held violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.' The United States Supreme Court, in Beardon v. Georgia," stated that "imprisonment may befall the probationer who
fails to make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay restitution."'47 The
Beardon Court reversed an order of revocation and a sentence of
imprisonment because there was insufficient proof that the probationer had failed to make a bona fide effort to pay. 48 The Code, in
requiring proof of a "willful refusal" to pay the fine, or to make restitution as a basis for revocation, appears to be in comfortable, constitutional compliance.'"
50
Among the specific, optional conditions permitted in the Code
is that for "reasonable public service" such as "picking up of litter
in public parks or along public highways or the maintenance of public facilities." Fashioning an appropriate public service assignment
presents a challenge in both definition and disposition. What is
"public service?" The term is not defined in the Act. When asked
for an interpretation, the Illinois Attorney General, citing "the
somewhat analogous provisions in Federal law for alternative work
for conscientious objectors, 5 1 concluded that the county board and
43. ILL. REv.STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-4.1(d) (1985). See also People v. Yantis, 125
Ill. App. 3d 767, 770, 466 N.E.2d 603, 605 (4th Dist. 1984) (it is the state which must
prove that the defendant failed to comply with financial conditions of probations);
People v. Mowery, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 695, 703, 452 N.E.2d 363, 370 (4th Dist. 1983) (the
state must pursue its civil remedies to collect money judgments).
44. People v. Harder, 59 Ill. 2d 563, 322 N.E.2d 470 (1975) (noncompliance not
evidence of willfulness alone). The Illinois Constitution requires that allowances of
adequate time for payments be made, in installments if necessary. ILL. CONST. art. I, §
14.
45. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1982); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
46. 461 U.S. 660 (1982).
47. Id. at 670.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1 (1985). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
51. 1978 Op. Ill.
Att'y Gen. 130 (no. S-1369).
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circuit court could establish a program "either limited to work for
governmental units or also including work for private nonprofit
agencies. '5 2 The federal regulation referred to in the opinion considers appropriate alternate work to include: services to any governmental unit or political subdivision, and to nonprofit organizations
primarily engaged in charitable activities for the benefit of the general public or for the improvement of public health of welfare. 3
By law, the county boards in the several counties, in cooperation with the circuit courts, are authorized to develop programs of
public service employment.54 Until that is done, trial courts appear
to have the authority to impose conditions for public service of far
wider scope and substance than picking up litter. In particular, one
might consider the effectiveness of applying this broad interpretation to dispositions of charges for violations of the motor vehicle
laws. Conditions of supervision requiring those with skills and specialties, whether in business, entertainment, the professions or
sports, to utilize them in public service assignments, might enhance
ongoing programs to reduce the incidence and tragedy of motor vehicle episodes. The performance of conditions of service should be
regularly, even rigorously, policed and no supervision should be terminated without a report on compliance. 5
There is an amplitude of conditions that have been formulated
in the trial courts under their discretionary powers to impose additional conditions. The touchstone of their propriety is relevance to
the offense and the Code. Satisfying this test have been orders that
a defendant guilty of aggravated battery and diagnosed as having a
"paranoid stance" may be directed to remain at a designed hospital
for psychiatric therapy and to refrain from making threatening telephone calls;56 that one guilty of fraud in a business could not maintain a proprietary interest in a similar business; 7 that a defendant
convicted of a stabbing was not to have any sharp instruments;5 8
and that an offender remain within the state, a condition that is now
specifically authorized for probationers." Failing the test of rele52. Id. at 132.
53. 32 C.F.R. § 1660.5 (1977). This regulation was part of the Selective Service
System, and stated which types of alternative service would be allowed in lieu of
induction into the Armed Forces. Id.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 204(a)(1) (1985).
55. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 152.
56. People v. McDonald, 52 Ill. App. 2d 298, 202 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1964).
57. United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Illinois
law).
58. People v. Nard, 32 Ill.
App. 3d 634, 335 N.E.2d 790 (2d Dist. 1975).
59. People v. Ragen, 2 Ill. 2d 124, 117 N.E.2d 390 (1954). See also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(a)(4) (1985). However, an order requiring the defendant to
leave the state for the period of probation is not valid. People v. Baun, 251 Mich. 187,
231 N.W. 95 (1930).
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vance were conditions that one guilty of aggravated battery could
not work in a tavern and that one convicted of a motor vehicle violation must get a haircut.6 0
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
1. Violation Discovered During Supervision
When a violation of the conditions in a misdemeanor case is ascertained before the period of supervision expires, a petition charging the violation may be filed. The circuit court clerk may be ordered to issue notice of the charge to the offender. Concurrently, a
warrant or summons, depending upon the circumstances, will then
be issued. If the petition is personally served or the notice, warrant
or summons is issued, the period of supervision is tolled and the
term does not run until the disposition of the charges of violation.61
The State has the burden of proving the violation "by the preponderance of the evidence. ' 6 2 The rationale for application of the civil
standard of proof in revocation proceedings is that in such proceedings the issue is not the defendant's guilt; that was established when
the order of supervision was entered." Ranging even more broadly
are those who do not regard an inquiry into revocation as criminal in
nature, and assert that many evidentiary rules do not apply
thereto."
The scope of such generalizations would probably be narrowed
when their application is sought. For example, it has been asserted
that insanity is not a defense in a revocation proceeding.6 5 It seems
most likely that the insanity defense would not be disregarded when
a determination is to be made of a "willful refusal" to pay.66 The
Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that a defendant who is not
60. People v. Dunn, 43 Ill.
App. 3d 94, 356 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist. 1976) (haircut); People v. Brown, 133 Ill. App. 2d 861, 272 N.E.2d 861 (1st Dist. 1971).
61. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-4(a) (1985). Thus, when the defendant was
in custody and appeared in court, neither a summons nor warrant was required. People v. Speight, 72 Ill. App. 3d 203, 389 N.E.2d 1342 (1st Dist. 1976). Furthermore, a
court has permitted a petition amendment after the probationary period expired.
People v. Owens, 116 Ill.
App. 3d 51, 451 N.E.2d 988 (2d Dist. 1983).
62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-4(c) (1985). See also Owens, 116 Ill. App. 3d
at 54, 451 N.E.2d at 990.
63. People v. Allegri, 127 Ill.
App. 3d 1041, 1045, 469 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (4th
Dist. 1984) (probation case), affd, 109 Ill. 2d 309, 486 N.E.2d 606 (1985).
64. Allegri, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 1042, 469 N.E.2d at 1128. But cf. Judge Trapp's
dissent, in which it is recognized that a revocation proceeding greatly affects personal
rights and liberties and should therefore afford the defendant the protections granted
to criminal prosecution defendants. Id. at 1049, 469 N.E.2d at 1132 (Trapp, J.,
dissenting).
65. Allegri, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 469 N.E.2d at 1132 affd, 109 Ill.2d 309, 486

N.E.2d 606.
66.

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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represented by counsel in a proceeding for revocation of probation,
may be entitled to an admonition as to his right to silence.67 The
privilege against self incrimination was later said to be of "undoubted existence" in an opinion which unequivocally declared that
except for the lesser burden of proof, civil rules do not apply to revocation proceedings." However, the application of rules that are basic to an original criminal proceeding has been denied in revocation
proceedings.6 The reconciliation of these opinions must recognize
the difference between the rhetoric and reality. The reality is that
the constitutional rights and procedures that have a direct influence
on the fairness and due process of the revocation proceeding have
been enacted in the Code and enforced in the courts. Thus, unless
waived, open court hearings, presence of counsel, and the rights of
confrontation and cross examination are procedural imperatives. 0
If the defendant is found to have violated the conditions imposed, whether or not the violative acts are criminal in character,
the court, after a sentencing hearing, may continue the defendant on
supervision with or without modifying the conditions, or may impose any sentence
that was available at the time of the original
"sentencing."71 A surprising clause appears in Paragraph 1005-64(h) of the Code; to wit, that "Resentencing after revocation" shall
be in accord with Paragraph 1005-5-3. The reference to "resentencing" is alien to supervision, for the Code provides that when an order of supervision is entered, the imposition of sentence shall be deferred.7" The legislative intent is clear. A challenge to the use of
"resentence" or its concept should result in giving the word "resentence" its obvious intended meaning as describing the sentencing
process after revocation. And the primary concern of that process is
that the punishment fit the crime; the original crime, that is."3
67. People v. Robertson, 30 Ill. 2d 168, 170, 195 N.E.2d 722, 723 (1964).
68. People v. Yantis, 125 Ill. App. 3d 767, 466 N.E.2d 603 (4th Dist. 1984). See
also People v. Coffman, 83 Ill.
App. 2d 272, 227 N.E.2d 108 (4th Dist. 1967), where
standards of due process were applied though the new criminal code had not readopted the due process standards. Cf. People v. Forman, 108 Ill.
App. 2d 482, 247
N.E.2d 917 (4th Dist. 1969) (permitting consideration of "rap sheets" even if hearsay
evidence).
69. People v. Beard, 59 II. 2d 220, 319 N.E.2d 745 (1974).
70. People v. Speight, 72 Ill. App. 3d 203, 389 N.E.2d 1342 (1st Dist. 1976). See
also People v. Paxton, 135 Ill. App. 3d 680, 683-84, 482 N.E.2d 180 (3d Dist. 1985)
(lacking minimal due process for number of infringements, including admission of
speculative and hearsay evidence).
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1005-6-4(e); 1005-6-4.1(e) & 1005-5-3 (1985).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(c) (1985). Yet, the imposition of a sentence
will not be deferred for probationary orders. Allegri, 127 Iln. App. 3d at 1045, 469
N.E.2d at 1129.
73. People v. Hoga, 109 Ill. App. 3d 258, 264, 440 N.E.2d 411, 415 (5th Dist.
1982). The process of probation, too, is concerned that the punishment fit the original
crime. People v. Clark, 97 Ill. App. 3d 953, 424 N.E.2d 9 (1st Dist. 1981); People v.
Matlock, 97 Ill. App. 3d 842, 423 N.E.2d 976 (4th Dist. 1981).
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The code establishes a two-year limit for the period of supervision. 4 If that period has not expired, the resentence may prolong
the existing supervision. If the two-year period has already expired,
options remain open for punishing the offender for violation of supervision."h When the punishment for the original offense warrants,
the defendant may be sentenced, alone or in combination, to probation, periodic imprisonment, conditional discharge and imprisonment and other penalties of a nonconfining nature listed in paragraph 1005-5-3(b) of the Code. Extending the supervision period for
another two years may violate the two-year limit. Moreover, if additional time for supervision is tacked on and regarded as the initial
"sentence," it might violate the five-year moratorium for a DUI
offender.7
The punitive elements of "resentencing" could be manifold: a
sentence of probation limited to one year;" or an extension of the
supervisory period, but this time with probationary supervision and
with additional conditions that could include periodic imprisonment
and home confinement; 8 or even imprisonment. Probation, of
course, creates a record of a conviction, perhaps bearing a more severe stigma than an adjudication of guilt after supervision. Imprisonment and periodic imprisonment can only be imposed if the offender has not been on supervision for six months if imprisonment
is ordered, or for twelve months if periodic imprisonment is ordered,
unless the trial court orders that the offender shall not receive credit
for time spent in supervision.7 9 In any event, the "resentencing" is
subject to the maximum periods of imprisonment and periodic imprisonment, as set forth in the Code"0 for the offense with which the
supervisee was first charged.81
2.

Violations Discovered After Supervision

Revocation proceedings that are instituted before the period of
supervision ends may obviously result in additional penalties. When
prosecutors discovered violations of conditions after the period of
supervision had ended, they nonetheless sought to initiate revoca74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(b) (1985).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-6-4.1 (1985).
76. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-2(b)(3) (1985).
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9 1005-6-3 (1985).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 9 1005-6-4.1(h) (1985).

80. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 38, §§ 1005-7-1 & 1005-6-3(d) (1985).

81. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. § 1005-5-4, which proscribes the
imposition of a "more severe" sentence on "resentencing except for conduct occurring
after the original sentence, should not affect the penalties for violations of a supervisory order because when it was entered, the defendant was neither convicted nor sen-

tenced. See ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(c) (1985).
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tion proceedings."2 They were, and perhaps were doomed to be, unsuccessful.83 This result was reached because of precedent in proba-

tion cases"

and because logic compels the conclusion that a

nonexistent condition cannot be modified or revoked.
The question naturally arises: what causes the State to permit
the expiration of the supervisory period without acting to revoke the
supervision? There are at least two answers. First, the defendant's
violation of the conditions may be unknown during the supervisory

period. Second, the order of supervision may have been entered
without setting a new court date before the end of the prescribed

period. To avoid this eventuality," the Circuit Court of Cook
County adopted Rule 11.6, which provides:
11.6 Termination of Supervision
a. Whenever a defendant is charged with a crime that has the potential of a jail sentence he shall be required to return to court on the
date set for the termination of supervision.
b. The court, on the record, shall inquire of the prosecuting authority
whether or not there is any objection to the termination. 8

This rule will apply not only to all felonies but also to all misdemeanors that carry a term of imprisonment.8 7 Faithful compliance

with Rule 11.6 should reduce the possibilities of having the end of a
supervisory period lapse without notice, and noncompliance escape

without detection.
NONCOMPLIANCE AND ADJUDICATION OF GUILT

When the period of supervision ends, but the defendant has not

complied with the conditions of supervision and time has effectively
foreclosed opportunities for revocation, 8 the order of supervision
abides a final disposition. Paragraph 1005-6-3.1 of the Code provides
that at the conclusion of the period of supervision, the court shall
82. See, e.g., People v. Hayslette, 107 Ill. App. 3d 647, 437 N.E.2d 1261 (3d
Dist. 1982).
83. Id.
84. E.g., In re Pacheco, 67 Ill. App. 3d 96, 384 N.E.2d 986 (1st Dist. 1978). The
Pacheco court viewed the need to hold revocation hearings prior to the expiration of
the probationary period as different than the statutory code requirements for petition
filing and service tolling during that probationary period. Id. See also In re Sneed, 72
Ill. 2d 326, 381 N.E.2d 272 (1978) (held that probation may not be extended or revoked without notice and a hearing and a finding that defendant has violated a condition of probation); People v. Randolph, 98 Ill. App. 3d 696, 424 N.E.2d 893 (1st Dist.
1981) (unless the state acts to toll the statute prior to the termination of the period of
probation, the probation cannot be revoked because it has, in fact, ended).
85. See Sullivan, supra note 15, at 192.
.86. CIR. CT. OF COOK CTY. ILL. R. 11.6 (effective May 1, 1985).
87. See id. (rule indicates that it will apply to any crime "that has the potential
of a jail sentence").
88. People v. Hayslette, 107 Ill. App. 3d 674, 437 N.E.2d 1261 (3d Dist. 1982).
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discharge the defendant who has successfully complied, and "enter a
judgment dismissing the charges," which shall "not be termed a conviction." 89 The obverse of this provison is not explicitly expressed in
the statute, therefore relegating the fate of the defendant who has
not successfully complied, to the penumbra of judicial construction.
Precedent from supervision cases under the Code is lacking.
However, decisions interpreting the "first offender" provision of the
Cannabis Control Act 0 indicate that there is both jurisdiction and
authority to enter an adjudication of guilt after the supervisory term
has ended. This "first offender" provision, which contains language
comparable to that facing a defendant placed on supervision under
the Code, has been interpreted to confirm jurisdiction to enter an
adjudication of guilt following the expiration of the first offender's
probation.91 The reason is the need for the court to determine
whether conditions have been fulfilled. The Illinois Supreme Court,
in People v. Du Montelle,"' also considered the status of first offenders and expressed its view that "after the probationarystatus expires, the Court must determine whether or not an adjudication of
guilt is to be entered based on the defendant's noncompliance or
compliance with the probationary period." 93
To regard a defendant placed on supervision as akin to a first
offender is appropriate, for both are likely to be youthful and nonviolent offenders. Allowing for an adjudication of guilt after the period
of supervision expired would comport with the precedent established for first offenders. The passage of time unquestionably deprives the court of authority to revoke the supervision of a noncompliant offender or to resentence him, but it would be unnecessary
and unfortunate to conclude that the court lacks jurisdiction to
make an adjudication. of guilt for noncompliance after supervision
terminated; unnecessary because, as in the case of first offenders,
the court is explicitly required to determine whether there has been
compliance9 ' and must make the obvious choice between satisfactory and unsatisfactory compliance; unfortunate because a denial of
jurisdiction to enter an adjudication of guilt would give sanction to
noncompliance.
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1 (1985).
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56-1/2, § 710 (1985).
91. People v. Glidden, 33 11. App. 3d 741, 338 N.E.2d 204 (3d Dist. 1975).
92. 71 111. 2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205 (1978).
93. Du Montelle, 71 Ill. 2d at 164, 374 N.E.2d at 208 (emphasis added).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(e) (1985). See also People v. Majer, 131
Ill. App. 3d 80, 84, 475 N.E.2d 269 (2d Dist. 1985); Hayslette, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 65051, 437 N.E.2d at 1264.
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No

COMPLIANCE;

No

CONTEMPT

May a defendant who has not complied with the orders of the
trial court be held in contempt of court? In People v. Mowery,95 this
question was answered affirmatively as to a defendant on probation.
The court observed:
It has been established that the contempt power of a trial court may
be exercised as a sanction for violation of probation. (People v. Patrick [1980], 83 Ill. App. 3d 951, 404 N.E.2d 1042). Patrickdealt with a
failure to report to the probation officer, hence the court interpreted it
as an indirect criminal contempt and explained the difference between
direct and indirect criminal contempt. In the instant case we have a
failure to pay costs and restitution. As suggested by the specially concurring justice in Patrick, this constitutes a civil contempt."
The Mowery decision does not, however, constitute precedent when
a defendant is charged with violating conditions of supervision. In
probation proceedings, sentences are imposed without deferment,
thus encumbering the probationer with an immediate record. On the
other hand, in supervision the proceedings are deferred, the sentence is in a state of suspense, and no sentence or judgment will ever
be entered if the defendant complies with the conditions. 97 The crucial differences between violations of probation orders and conditions of suspended sentences has been explained in the following
manner:
The distinction between restitution as a sentence and as a condition
of probation or suspended sentence is important in several respects.
First, the alternatives in the event of default in payment are quite
different, consisting of contempt proceedings in the former and revocation and imposition of a sentence in the latter."
The statutory scheme has provided a reward for compliance
with the conditions of supervision: a discharge that is not to be
termed a conviction. As such, it may be analogized to contractual
conditions, which are clearly different from direct undertakings.
This distinction has been elucidated in Williston on Contracts:
The distinction between a promise or covenant on the one hand and a
condition on the other, both in their legal effect and in their wording,
is obvious and familiar. Breach of promise subjects the promisor to
liability in damages but does not necessarily excuse the performance
on the other side. Breach or nonoccurrence of a condition prevents the
promisee from acquiring a right or deprives him of one but subjects
him to no liability."9
95. 116 Il. App. 3d 695, 452 N.E.2d 363 (4th Dist. 1983).
96. Mowery, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 701, 452 N.E.2d at 368.
97. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3(e) to 1005-6-3(f) (1985).
98. Harland, supra note 40, at 72.
99.

5 S. WILISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRAcTs § 665 (3d ed. 1961).
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In at least one criminal case, 100 a court applied this rationale to a
condition for restitution in an order of supervision, explaining:
No judgment is rendered for, nor could a writ of execution issue to
enforce collection of the sum specified. A defendant in such instance
is simply given the alternative of abiding by the conditions imposed or
else suffering the imposition and execution of a sentence which ordinarily follows a verdict of guilty. . . he was given the additional privilege of avoiding the usual penalty of his crime by the payment of a
sum of money and the observance of the other conditions attached to
his probation.' 01

If the contract theory prevails, a failure to make restitution or
to pay fees or costs, which were designated as conditions of supervision, would not create independent liabilities giving rise to responsibility for contempt or for consequent money judgments. 0 2 This

would insulate the offender from "resentencing" for noncompliance
in those courts which do not require a compliance hearing to be held
before the supervisory period has terminated.103 The practice of
holding final hearing, as Circuit Court of Cook County Rule 11.6
now requires, would preclude inadvertent immunity for violators of
supervisory conditions, for the hearing would offer the State both
time and opportunity to petition for revocation if the hearing points
to a need therefor.104 The occasion for pressing a contempt of court
petition would then be unnecessary in fact and inappropriate in
theory.
Does denial of contempt powers'0 5 constitute a legislative impingement upon the inherent powers of the judiciary? There are a
number of reasons for denying that there is any legislative intrusion
into the judicial function. The supervision statute was enacted when
the legislature followed the Illinois Supreme Court's recommendation that it do so.'"° The penalties are those set forth in the enactment, and the court is limited by them. 07 If the order is interpreted
as establishing conditions rather than expressing commands, the
conclusion that the penalties for violation of the conditions are limited to those set by the court after the revocation hearing would be
solely judicial and free from legislative denigration of the power of
100. People v. Good, 287 Mich. 110, 282 N.W. 920 (1938).
101. Id. at 115, 282 N.W. at 923.
102. People v. Mowery, 116 I1. App. 3d 695, 705, 452 N.E.2d 363, 370 (4th Dist.
1983). In Mowery, which was a contempt action for violation, the state was relegated
"to its civil remedies for the collection of money judgments." Id.
103. People v. Hayslette, 107 Ill. App. 3d 647, 437 N.E.2d 1261 (3d Dist. 1982).
104. People v. McMurray, 391 Ill. 271, 62 N.E.2d 793 (1945).
105. Legislatures may enlarge, but not restrict, the exercise of the contempt
powers of the courts. In re G.B., 88 Ill. 2d 36, 430 N.E.2d 1096 (1981); People v.
White, 334 Ill. 465, 166 N.E. 100 (1929).
106. See People v. Breen, 62 Ill. 2d 323, 342 N.E.2d 31 (1976).

107. People v. Penn, 302 Ill. 488, 495, 135 N.E. 92, 95 (1922).
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contempt. 0 8
NEVER ACQUITTED; NEVER CONVICTED

Supervision is defined in the code in more than 40 words."'
Rather than repeat this evident wordiness, writers and courts have
oft-times elected to substitute words which, being more commonly
known, do not require 40 word definitions. Thus, supervision has
been called or analogized to, "deferment,"" 0 or "continuance" or
"acquittal.""' The unfolding law on supervision suggests that it is
all of them and none of them and the shorthand analogies that
emerge in dicta must ever yield to the specific analysis in decisions.
Thus, the general belief that an offender who complies with the conditions of supervision will not have a record of conviction, cannot be
applied in every case. 2 The statutory point of reference" s is short
but not simple. The Code provides that on successful conclusion of
supervision, the discharge and dismissal "shall be deemed without
adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.""' The parameters of conviction, innocence or guilt
after supervision has ended, have required determination in a variety of contexts.
As Evidence at Sentencing Hearings
When a defendant is before the court for sentencing, after con108. On the other hand, "conditions" in probation orders have been construed
as mandatory, subjecting the violator to penalties for contempt. People v. Patrick, 83
Ill. App. 3d 951, 404 N.E.2d 1042 (4th Dist. 1980). In a concurring opinion, Judge
Trapp noted that the contempt penalty should not be imposed for cases arising after
the Patrick decision, but rather probationary violations should be prosecuted according to statute. Id. at 957, 404 N.E.2d at 455-56.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-21 (1985) provides:
"Supervision" means a disposition of conditional and revocable release without probationary supervision, but under such conditions and
reporting requirements as are imposed by the court, at the successful
conclusion of which disposition the defendant is discharged and a
judgment dismissing the charges is entered.
110. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1(c) (1985) (order of supervision defers
further proceedings). See supra note 26.
111. Compare People v. Roper, 116 Ill. App. 3d 821, 824, 452 N.E.2d 748, 750
(1st Dist. 1983) (supervision is continuance) with People v. Tarkowski, 100 Ill.
App.
3d 153, 157, 161, 426 N.E.2d 631, 634, 637 (2d Dist. 1981) (uncompleted supervision is
continuance, and termination of supervision is judgment of acquittal). But see People
v. Oswald, 106 Ill. App. 3d 645, 435 N.E.2d 1369 (2d Dist. 1982) (termination of supervision with finding of guilt is not acquittal for purposes of appeal).
112. See People v. Hightower, 138 Ill.App.3d 5, 12-13 (Stouder, J., dissenting).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(0 (1985).
114. Id.
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viction or plea of guilty, may evidence be introduced of a supervision that was successfully completed? In People v.Calvert,'1 the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District found the introduction of
such evidence to be error but harmless."' In People v. Talach,17 the
Appellate Court for the Second District, expressing disagreement
with Calvert, found that the defendant's prior supervision successfully completed, could be considered in a hearing on sentencing, and
stressed that the "important considerations are relevance and accuracy of the information.'"
The Talach opinion reiterated that the defendant's supervision
had not been expunged.119 The implications of this emphasis on expungement are not clear, but expungement would seem to have little
relevance to helping a court determine an appropriate sentence. The
effect of successfully completing supervision should be determined
without regard to an inadvertent failure to complete the expungement process. If the defendant's record was not expunged, the reason for denying expungement may be a relevant consideration in determining the defendant's sentence, but the expungement itself
should not affect the admissibility of evidence as to the successful
completion of supervision.
More crucial is the statutory language that successfully completed supervision shall not be termed a conviction "for purposes of
disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of
crime."' 2 0 This clause, Talach stated, "2 ' refers to the loss of the right
to hold public office, to vote, to possess firearms or (a most remote
event) to practice medicine. The Talach court, therefore, concluded
that the disposition of a supervision successfully completed could be
considered at a sentencing hearing. 22 In so deciding, Talach followed People v. LaPointe," which enunciated an even broader rule;
to wit, that after exercising caution to assure that the information
proffered was accurate, no trial judge may "properly receive proof of
criminal conduct for which no prosecution and conviction ensues."'2 4
The latitude for the introduction of impositions and dispositions of
115. 100 Ill.
App. 3d 510, 426 N.E.2d 1218 (4th Dist. 1981).
116. Calvert, 100 Ill. App. 3d at 512, 426 N.E.2d at 1220.
117. 114 Ill. App. 3d 813, 448 N.E.2d 638 (2d Dist. 1983).
118. Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 827, 448 N.E.2d at 648. See also People v.
Hightower, 138 Ill.App.3d 5, 10 (3d Dist. 1985).

119. Id. at 827, 448 N.E.2d at 647. See also supra note 22 and accompanying
text (expungment discussed); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206-5 (1985) (expungement procedure under Illinois law).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(f) (1985).
121. Talach, 114 Ill.
App. 3d at 826, 448 N.E.2d at 647.

122. Id. at 826, 448 N.E.2d at 648.
123. 88 Ill.
2d 482, 431 N.E.2d 344 (1981).
124. La Pointe, 88 Ill.
2d at 498-99, 431 N.E.2d at 344, cited wit. approval in
Talach, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 826-27, 448 N.E.2d at 648.
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supervision in post-trial sentencing hearings has not been accorded
to proffers of like proof during trials.
As A Basis for Impeachment and Admissions
In People v. Schuning, " the defendant was tried for rape and
unlawful restraint. There was evidence admitted of, inter alia, a
conviction statement for the offense of retail theft, for which the
defendant had been placed on, and discharged from, supervision.
The prosecutor urged the jury to consider the effect of the "conviction" on credibility. The court stated that "the successful completion of a period of supervision does not result in a conviction .. .
and therefore is not a proper basis for impeachment."1 "
In Brown v. Green,2 7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit ruled on the propriety of introducing evidence
of a prior order of supervision in a civil proceeding as prima facie
evidence of the facts on which the finding of guilty was based.
Brown asserted that proof of the supervision was not admissible because it had been successfully completed and hence the "conviction
was in any event erased."' 1 8 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating:
"Although the [Illinois] supervision statute required that after successful conclusion of his supervision the charges against Brown be
dismissed and his conviction erased for some purposes, this was not
29
true for all purposes."
The Seventh Circuit's narrow interpretation of the statutory
language that defines the effect of a successful supervision' should
not have a substantial impact on misdemeanor prosecutions. If it
were held that successfully completed supervision would not be automatically rejected as establishing a "no conviction" situation for
all purposes, the record of supervision would not only be available as
an admission, but would also be available for purposes of impeachment if it met the requirement announced in People v.Montgomery;13 to wit, that evidence of criminal conviction for the purpose of
impeachment is only admissible if (1) the crime was punishable by
death or confinement for more than one year or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statements; unless (3) the judge deter125. 106 Ill. 2d 41, 476 N.E.2d 423 (1985).
126. Shuning, 106 Ill. 2d at 48, 476 N.E.2d at 426. See also People v. Miller, 101
Ill. App. 3d 55, 427 N.E.2d 987 (1981) (successful supervision is not a conviction for
impeachment purposes); CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE, § 609
(4th ed. 1984) (use of convictions for impeachment).

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

738 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1984).
Green, 738 F.2d at 207-08.
Id. at 208.
The statutory language appears supra text accompanying note 114.
47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971).
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substantially outweighs
mines that the danger of unfair prejudice
1 2
the probative value of the evidence.
By reason of restricting the availability of supervision to
nonfelony offenses and by limiting the maximum term of imprisonment for misdemeanors to less than one year,1 8 the first requirement of Montgomery could not be met. The alternative requirement, that the crime for which the defendant was convicted
involved dishonesty or false statements, would effect the exclusion
of supervision granted for motor vehicle violations and a myriad of
petty or other misdemeanor offenses. The misdemeanor cases involving dishonesty or false statements require a court determination
that the probative value of the conviction-evidence outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice. The principal requirement remaining is
that conviction has not been the subject of a "certificate of rehabilitation" or other equivalent procedure acquired after "a substantial
184
showing or rehabilitation.
A supervisory proceeding should culminate in a court made determination of the defendant's compliance or noncompliance with
the conditions of supervision. Because the objective of supervision is
rehabilitation, it does not appear unreasonable to suggest that completing the period of supervision and complying with all the conditions of the court order, should constitute not only proof of compliance, but also proof that the supervisee has made a substantial
showing of rehabilitation. If the Montgomery rule permits this construction, the successful conclusion of supervision would be denied
admissibility to impeach credibility because even if it were a conviction, it would fail to meet the requirements of Montgomery.
As a Basis for Fines and Costs
In People v. Du Montelle,' 85 the action of the appellate court in
affirming the imposition of a fine and costs on a "first offender" probationer who pleaded guilty to the possession of cannabis was in issue. The Illinois Supreme Court decided that the criminal cost statute1 86 is limited to assessment of costs against persons "convicted of
an offense," and that a "first offender," who successfully completes
probation, obtains a dismissal of the charge, and a discharge, is not
2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 698. Although not included in
132. Montgomery, 47 Ill.
the statement of the general rule, the effect of pardons, anuilments, and rehabilita-

tions must also be considered. Id.
133.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-2(b)(3)

134.

Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d at 699, quoting rule 609 of the

(1985).

Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the Un;ted States.
135. 71 Ill. 2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205 (1978).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-3 (1985).
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convicted within the meaning of the cost statute.1 3 7 The Cannabis
Control Act (the "Act") authorized a defendant to be placed on probation "upon reasonable terms and conditions.' ' 8 The Du
Montelle, court declared that a fine was a "primitive measure" that
did not comport with the "general lenient purpose of the Act," and
was not, under the circumstances, a reasonable term and condition.' 9 The provisions of the Code that explicitly include costs and
fines as segments of dispositions in probation cases were quoted, but
not questioned in Du Montelle."0
The constitutionality of the Code's sanctions,"' which impose
fines and costs in supervision cases, was contested to a "no decision"
2
finish in Morgan v. Finley."1
The defendant, after supervision was
terminated, challenged the constitutionality of assessing a fine and
costs against one not convicted of any offense."' The defendant relied on a United States Supreme Court decision, " which held that
neither penalty nor costs could be imposed upon a defendant
"whom the jury found not guilty. . . . "" Manifestly, the status of a
defendant found not guilty by a jury is unrelated to that of a second
defendant who pleaded guilty or was found guilty. The defendant
who complies with the conditions of supervision, which might include a fine and costs, does not thereby cleanse his record to the
equivalence of innocence and become entitled to a refund.
In Du Montefle," the Illinois Supreme Court found incongruity and unreasonableness in a court's imposing a fine and costs
on a first-offender probationer when the Act did not include express
provisions therefor. That disapprobation is not likely to apply to
conditions that are the product of legislative deliberation.
As a Basis for Malicious Prosecution
Some offenders, who have completed their assigned period of
supervision and have been discharged, have taken literally the myth
that on completing supervision, a defendant escapes a record of conviction and acquires a cloak of innocence. Thereafter, when the of137. Du Monte le, 71 Ill. 2d at 165-66, 374 N.E.2d at 208.
138. Id. at 164-65, 374 N.E.2d at 207 (citing the Cannabis Control Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 56-1/2, § 704 (1985)).

139. Du Montelle, 71 Ill. 2d at 165, 374 N.E.2d at 208.
140. Id.

141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-3.1(c)(2) (1985).
142. 105 Ill. App. 3d 80, 433 N.E.2d 1047 (1st Dist. 1982). The constitutionality
of monetary sanctions was also challenged, with equal results, in Malone v. Consentino, 99 Ill. 2d 29, 475 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
143. Finley, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 81, 433 N.E.2d at 1048.
144. Giacio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
145. Id. at 404-05.
146. People v. Du Montelle, 71 111. 2d 157, 374 N.E.2d 205 (1978).
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fender becomes convinced of "wronged innocence," an action for
malicious prosecution is initiated. The keystone questions are
whether the criminal proceeding was terminated147 and whether it
was terminated in favor of the defendant in the criminal case. 4" The
entry of an order of supervision on a finding or plea of guilty,
whether the conditions are light or lenient, can hardly be the basis
for supporting an action for malicious prosecution. A psychologist
might urge, having in mind the alternate possibilities, that the order
of supervision is a disposition favorable to the defendant. The courts
have not accepted such sophisticated and speculative contentions.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Joiner v. Benton Community
Bank, " made a felicitous restatement of the basic rule, which dispels any ambiguity that attaches to the language requiring "a
favorable termination."' 1 50 In Joiner, the court stated: "It is clear
that the settled law bars a malicious prosecution action predicated
upon criminal proceedings which were terminated in a matter not
indicative of the innocence of the accused."'' 1
The Joiner rule was followed in Hajawii v. Venture Stores,
Inc.,1 2 wherein a complaint for malicious prosecution was filed by
Hajawii, who had been placed on three months' supervision after
being found guilty of retail theft in a criminal prosecution. After
termination of the supervision, the criminal charges were dismissed.
Hajawii contended that the criminal proceeding should be regarded
as having been favorably terminated because of the successful conclusion of the supervision, but this contention was rejected. 53 There
is little prospect that any court will decide that an opportunity offered for rehabilitation may be converted into an occasion for
retaliation.
As a Basis for Defamation
The following is a hypothetical scenario in which the issue of
"conviction" appears in another context and once more presents
perplexing problems as to guilt, innocence, and conviction. On one
fine day, defendant Fingers was found guilty of retail theft and
placed on supervision. That evening Fingers visited a tavern to celebrate. After a few drinks, bar-mate Gabby learned of Fingers' expe147.
148.
149.
150.

Blalock v. Randall, 76 Ill. 224 (1875).
52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 29 (Supp. 1985).
82 Ill. 2d 40, 411 N.E.2d 229 (1980).
Joiner, 82 Ill. 2d at 45, 411 N.E.2d at 232.

151. Id.
152. 125 Ill. App. 3d 22, 465 N.E.2d 573 (lst Dist. 1984).
153. Hajawii, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 24-25, 465 N.E.2d at 575-76. See also Stranger
v. Felix, 97 Ill. App. 3d 585, 422 N.E.2d 1142 (1st Dist. 1981) (supervisio.1 termination
not grounds for malicious prosecution action).
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rience with the law, jumped on the bar, and in stentorian tones proposed a toast to Fingers "who was convicted of retail theft in open
court and is smart enough to be free on supervision." Unbeknown to
Gabby, Fingers' employer overheard the toast and fired Fingers.
Fingers promptly filed a slander action alleging that Gabby's assertion that he was convicted was false and slanderous and that the
imputation of conviction for crime is as actionable as an imputation
of the commission of crime.1 5 4 There are two possibilities that may
result.
First, Fingers successfully completed supervision, and his case
was dismissed. Two years thereafter, before the action came to trial,
Fingers' record of arrest was expunged. Will Fingers win his defamation suit?
Second, before the period of supervision ended, Fingers was
charged with violating the conditions of supervision. At a hearing,
the court found Fingers guilty of the violation and entered an adjudication of guilt. Will Fingers win his defamation suit?
The schizophrenic character of supervision beclouds the answer.
The word "convicted" was used by Gabby in its popular sense as
descriptive of an event that occurs before a court enters a punitive
order.15 5 Gabby was unaware that an order of supervision is not accompanied by an adjudication of guilt or a sentence. When the toast
was proposed, no adjudication of guilt had been made, even though
there was a finding of guilt, and no conviction had been entered.
May Fingers therefore prevail because the statement was legally inaccurate? In the second example, the supervision was revoked and a
judgment of guilty entered. Presumably, the defamatory statement,
false when made, became true. Was Gabby purged of the slander?
Does that purification operate retroactively to exculpate Gabby?
Thus ends the tale of Janus-faced supervision. Neither face can
be called "acquittal" or "conviction."
CONCLUSION

Few issues in criminal justice generate more heat and less consensus than making the punishment fit the crime. The overcrowding
of jails, the desire to reserve imprisonment for the dangerous and
hardened, and the reticence to incarcerate first offenders, especially
white-collar criminals, led to increasing emphasis on alternative
sentences. These included combinations of conditions such as com154.
155.

53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 54 (Supp. 1985).
For a publisher's unsuccessful effort to define "convicted" in a popular

sense rather than the legal definition (after court order), see Norton v. Livingston, 64
Vt. 473, 24 A. 247 (1892).
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munity service, restitution, and a myriad of other alternatives which
are limited only by the Code, 150 creativity, and the obligation to
make the penalty relevant to the statutory objectives. The introduction into the Code of supervision orders for nonfelony offenders legitimized a practice which permitted-without confinement, without
a disposition, and without a record of conviction-a disposition of
supervision carrying little sting and little stigma. Public charges of
leniency, complaints against mild sentences for financial crimes, and
questions about "tougher sentences for crime in the streets than for
crime in the suites' 5 7 have led to increasing use of imprisonment as
the ultimate sanction. Notwithstanding the current emphasis on incarceration, the nonconfinement alternatives available with orders of
supervision appear to have an assured future.

156. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
157. See WALL. ST. J., Oct. 30, 1985, at 31, col. 4. See also id., Nov. 14, 1985, at
1, col. 1, in which a defendant found guilty for accepting "kickbacks" thanked the
American probationary system, but endorsed a "strong judicial system" like that "in
Saudi Arabia, [where] when you steal, you get your hand cut off." Id., Aov. 14, 1985,
at 25, col. 1.

